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Background: Around 2015, with the alternation of population generation, post-
1960s baby boomers start to retire and post-1990s and 2000s baby busters
successively enter into labor market in China, which has led to the decrease of
working-age population, the increase of pension burden.
Methods: We use dynamic programming method by improving the traditional OLG
model.
Results: This paper finds that a combination of immediately delayed retirement and
accumulated pension system should be implemented if based on the goal of maximizing
output, while a combination of undelayed retirement and accumulated pension system
should be implemented if based on the goal of maximizing utility. Certainly, with using
efficiency of elements unchanged, with the decrease of working-age population caused
by the alternation of population generation, the increase of pension burden and the
disappearance of capital dividend, a sharp decline of future economic growth cannot be
changed no matter what kind of pension and retirement systems are implemented.
Conclusions: In view of the substitutability of family utility and social output and
synthesizing reform resistance, a combination of gradually delayed retirement and
accumulative pension system should be implemented. At the same time, on the premise
of stabilizing short-term economic situation, we should look for a new engine for
economic development by system reform in the long run.
Keywords: Retirement system, Pension policy, Post-1960s baby boomers, Social output
and family utility
Background
Around 2015, with the alternation of population generation, post-1960s baby boomers
start to retire and post-1990s and 2000s baby busters successively enter into labor mar-
ket in China, which has led to the decrease of working-age population, the increase of
pension burden, and the disappearance of demographic dividend in China (see Fig. 1).
Labor engine for Chinese economy will flame out. If China’s economy does not shift
from depending on the quantity of labor force to depending on technology, capital,
and population quality, while carrying out industrial updating, it is highly possible in
the long run that China’s economic will enter into the normal situation of low speed,
fall into the middle-income trap (Cai 2011), and hit the demographic cliff according to
the current development model. Technological progress, improvement of population2016 The Author(s). Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
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Fig. 1 Population of entering into and exiting from the labor market
Yang China Finance and Economic Review  (2016) 4:11 Page 2 of 15quality, and upgrading of industrial structure cannot be realized in the short time. With
the conversion of that demographic dividend turn into demographic debt, capital divi-
dend will also gradually disappear. In order to equip the economy with a new engine
and evade economic upheaval caused by sharp retirement of post-1960s baby boomers
and win time for economic restructure, technological progress, the improvement of
population quality, and upgrading of industrial structure in the long period, former en-
gine must be remolded in the short period to stabilize the economy and make it ad-
vance slowly and then change her track. As regards remolding previous engine, for
example, the calls for changing pension system and delaying retirement system in the
short period to mitigate the impact of decrease of laboring population and excessive
pension burden on economic system during the retirement period of post-1960s baby
boomers are getting louder and louder in political circles and academy circles.
Along with the implementation of the new farmers’ security in 2009, new endowment
insurance for urban residents in 2010, and pension reform of public institution in
2015,, China has formed a unified mode of the combination of social pooling and indi-
vidual account, namely, the current system of supporting for the elderly is a mixture of
family support and social pension; social pension system is a hybrid scenario of pay as
you go system and funded system. China’s current retirement system has been formed
in 1978, the document stipulates that male workers and cadres retire at the age of
60 years old, female cadres retire at the age of 55 year old, female workers retire at the
age of 50 years old, and the average retirement age is about 55 years old. Of course,
there are a lot of contents on the reform of the pension and retirement system. Here,
the author pays more attention to the reform of intergenerational distribution effect of
pension system, and retirement mode choose according to retirement age. Based on
the above key points of research, two important reforms on China’s pension and retire-
ment system are as follows, whether we should delay the retirement, or not and
whether we should increase the accumulation effect of pension and the proportion of
personal account in order to establish fully funded pension system, or not.
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ample, Yuan (2014) thought that delayed retirement could mitigate the gap size of pension
and lessen finance stress for the government, the study on OECD countries showed that
continued employment of the aged would not result in taking more positions which belong
to the young (Kalwij et al. 2010), in fact, there is the complementarity between the employ-
ment of the aged and the employment of the young. Yang and Xie (2014) thought that, after
entering into new normal, continued employment of the retiree would increase employ-
ment pressure on the young; Michello and Ford (2006) thought that delayed retirement
would result in taking more positions which belong to the young, especially in those sec-
tions which already have surplus workers, et al. Therefore, whether delayed retirement
should be implemented, or not, which is a question to answered explicitly. Different pension
systems certainly have different features. Gayane (2015) thought funded pension system is
more vulnerable to inflation risk, while in contrast, pay-as-you-go system does not have this
problem. The future studies showed that in reality, if based on the perspective of maximiz-
ing investment and output, funded pension system is superior to pay-as-you-go system
(Chybalski 2011); family support system exists widely in China’s vast rural area; during the
period of demographic dividend, we should universally implement pay-as-you-go system
(Ke and Yuan 2004); what kind of pension mode should be chosen is a question which need
to be answered urgently when post-1960s baby boomers start to retire in China.
With post-1960s baby boomers starting to reach retirement age and post-1990s and
2000s baby busters successively entering into the labor market, at the same time, the up-
grading of industrial structure and the improvement of population quality cannot be real-
ized in the short time. In terms of research questions, few literature, taking China’s special
national conditions into account (for example, China’s fertility behavior is strictly controlled
by population policy, child-rearing is not only consumer behavior but also is investment
behavior, pension system is a hybrid scenario of PAYG system, fund pension system, sav-
ings and child support, after 2015, post-60s baby boomers will start to reach retirement age
in succession, China implements universal two-child policy) analyzes various pension and
retirement systems by considering fertility behavior, retirement system, and pension mode
in one-model framework and selects pension and retirement systems which are suitable for
future conditions in China based on some policy goals. In terms of research method, exist-
ing literatures mostly adopt overlapping generation model (OLG), but, in the next 15 years
and short-term, the OLG model of examining intergenerational conversion, which cannot
reflect the changes of annual output and family utility according with real situation, also
cannot simulate the annual influence of post-1960s baby boomers’ retirement on every as-
pect of socioeconomic system in the short time. Based on the defects of existing literatures,
from the angle of maximizing social output and family utility, this article tries to give some
alternative pension and retirement scenarios, and then tries to appraise those pension and
retirement systems which may be put into effect by the government in the future by using
the dynamic programming model, finally, chooses pension and retirement systems which
are suitable for Chinese current and future national conditions.
Methods
Population can be divided into three types for any period: adolescent, adult, and the
aged; the population at the age of 0–15 years old is defined as adolescent, while the age
interval of adult and elderly population depends on the retirement system. Adolescents
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from parents’ support; in the next period, some adolescents become adult. Adult supply
labor for labor income each period, and in order to achieve maximum utility, adults
make decision on how to allocate current labor income into consumption, savings, pen-
sion, supporting for the elderly, and child-rearing. Some adults become old people in the
next period; here, we assume that total social utility is approximately equal to the utility
of adult. Elderly population does not participate in work and does not make social deci-
sions, such as fertility decision. Their income comes from pension, adult support, and
savings; some elderly people will die in the next period. The utility function of adult in-
cludes two parts: current consumption utility stream and utility stream in the next period.
Theoretical framework
Following Barro and Becker (1989) and Liao (2013), utility function is set as follows, inter-
temporal substitution elasticity of consumption is σ, discount factor is β, the proportion
of social pooling accounts pension to wage and the proportion of personal accounts
pension to wage is τ1 and τ2 respectively, and the total proportion of pension to wage
is τ = τ1 + τ2. For each subsequent period, we uniformity assume that the initial period is
i, the proportion of family support for each elderly population to wage is ϕ, and the pro-
portion of family expenditure for each adolescent to wage is μ. Consumption, savings for
i-th period, and consumption for i + 1-th period is Ci
1,Si, and Ci
2, respectively. In the i-th
period, the number of total population, adolescent, labor population (or adult), and elderly
population is Pi, Hi, Li, and Oi respectively. The wage of i-th period, the wage of i + 1-th
period, and interest rates of i + 1-th period is wi,wi+1, and ri + 1,respectively. Relaxing fertil-
ity regulation does not affect human capital level of labor population before 2030. We as-
sume that fertility level is exogenous, fully controlled by a fertility policy, and the
fertility level of policy is equal to actual fertility level; according to this assumption,
the total fertility rate (referred to as TFR) of universal two-child policy is about 2.
We regard technological progress as system or reform bonus, pension system influ-
ences the setup of model and parameter, and delayed retirement does not influence the
number of labor, but affect the number of retiree or pensioners. The number of popula-
tion who are going to retire is REi for i-th period. The number of labor Li for i-th
period is calculated according to the population (adult) of each age group and corre-
sponding labor participation rate of each age group. Population at the age of i years old
is Pi(j) for i-th period, labor force participation rate for the population aged j years old
is ERi(j) for i-th period, in order to simplify the processing; each period, we suppose
that labor force participation rate in each age group is fixed on the level of 2010 with-
out affecting analytical results, so total number of labor for i-th period is as follows.
Li ¼
X54
j¼16Pi jð ÞER2010 jð Þ; i ¼ 2014; 2015;…; 2030 ð1Þ
The current tongzhang pension system (referred to as TZPS) is a combination of social
planning pension (pay as you go system), individual accounts pension (accumulated pen-
sion system or funded pension system), and family support. According to its feature, labor
income is Liwi in the i-th period. It is spent on consumption Ci
1, savings Si, child-rearing
expense Hiμwi, elderly-rearing expenditure ϕwiOi, social planning pension τ1Liwi, and in-
dividual account pension expenditure τ2Liwi .Consumption Ci
1 happens utility stream
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1)σ in the i-th period. In the i + 1-th period, savings Si obtains Si(1 + ri+1) unit income,
τ2Liwi(1 + ri+1) term is the return of τ2Liwi term, τ1Liwi þ τ1Liþ1wiþ1REiOiþ1 −τ1LiwiREi=Li term
is the return of τ1Liwi. Taking investment culture on pension of bringing up child into
account, so child-rearing expenditure Hiμwi and elderly-rearing expenditure ϕwiOi ob-
tain (Hiμwi + ϕwiOi) unit income in the i-th period. The term of consumption Ci
1 hap-
pens utility stream in the i-th period, the term of Si, τ2Liwi, τ1Liwi, Hiμwi, and ϕwiOi
happens utility stream in the i + 1-th period. Under the TZPS, annual decision problem
which labor population faces is how to choose consumption and savings in order to
achieve maximized utility goal of annual labor income. Finally, objective function and
constraints for i-th period are as follows.
s:t:
MaxUi ¼ C1i
 σ þ β C2i σ
1−τð ÞLiwi ¼ C1i þ Si þ Hiμwi þ Oiϕwi








REi ¼ Pi jð Þ
i ¼ 2014; 2015;…; 2030
j ¼ 54; 55;…; 64




Following Barro and Lee (2010), firstly, we calculate average schooling years of labor
population si in the i-th period, then we calculate human capital level hi for i-th period
according to PWT version 8.0. For each age group, we assume that si(j) is the average
years of schooling of each labor population aged j years old for i-th period. Li(j) is the
number of working people aged j years old for i-th period. Finally, the average year of
schooling per labor si for i-th period is as follows.
si ¼
X54
j¼16Li jð Þsi jð Þ=
X54
j¼16Li jð Þ ð3Þ
Considering that average years of schooling si for i-th period cannot directly enterinto production function, we introduce the rate of return on average years of schooling.
Finally, we regard human capital level hi as a function of average years of schoolingsi,
according to the function provided by Penn World Table 8.0, we can find
hi ¼ eφ sið Þ; si ¼
X54
j¼16Li jð Þsi jð Þ=
X54
j¼16Li jð Þ ð4Þ
Because education level shows discontinuous characteristic, so human capital function
is a piecewise function. At the same time, many studies show that the return rate on early
education is higher than that of later education, finally, referring to the research work of
Psacharopoulos (1994), Lu and Cai (2014), φ(si) for i-th period is set as follows.
φ sið Þ ¼
0:134  4−sið Þ; si≦4
0:134  4þ 0:101  si−4ð Þ; 4 < si≦8
0:134  4þ 0:101  4þ 0:068  si−8ð Þ; 8 < si
8<
: ð5Þ
In the above model, we use C-D production function of constant return to scale andassume that contribution quotient of capital α is invariant. In order to simplify analy-
tical process, we use average years of schooling si to characterize human capital level of
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uctivity is a variable which is calibrated. Finally, production function for i-th period and
production function for i + 1-th period is set as follows.
Y i ¼ A Kið Þα hiLið Þ1−α
Y iþ1 ¼ A Kiþ1ð Þα hiþ1Liþ1ð Þ1−α

ð6Þ
According to profit maximization conditions that capital marginal revenue is equal tointerest rate and labor marginal revenue is equal to wage for each period. Capital mar-
ginal revenue is the first derivative of production function with respect to capital, labor
marginal revenue is the first derivative of production function with respect to labor.
TZPS is a combination of social planning pension, individual accounts pension and
family support, the pension for personal accounts is cumulative, so current savings and
individual account pension will increase capital stock of next period together. We as-
sume that capital depreciation rate is δ, savings is equal to investment, and corruption
does not exist in the pension. The stock of capital Ki+1 for i + 1-th period is equal to
the sum of current stock of capital Ki, savings Si and pension τ2Liwi in the i-th period,
and then the above sum deducts depreciation δKi.Finally, according to the above
assumptions, the motion equation of capital for each period is set as follows
Kiþ1 ¼ 1−δð ÞKi þ Si þ τ2Liwi; i ¼ 2014; 2015;…; 2030 ð7Þ
How to calculate the motion equation of total population or labor population? Here,
we follow Lu and Cai (2014)’s work and assume that fertility level is fully controlled by
the fertility policy; under this condition, if we know policy fertility level for each period,
and will also know initial population distribution and corresponding mortality at each
age stage, we will also know future population distribution at each age stage. According
to “2014 Chinese population and Employment Statistics Yearbook,” TFR is about 1.3 in
2013, that is TFR of maintaining the fertility policy unchanged, the policy TFR of uni-
versal two-child policy is about 2.0.We put population distribution in 2014 for different
gender at each age stage as an initial population distribution and put mortality between
2003 and 2013 for different gender at each age stage as population update criteria.
Firstly, we calculate population distribution for different gender at each age stage, we
get the number of people at each age stage by the sum of the number of population for
different gender for each age stage, and then we get the total population by adding the
number of the population at each age group. Secondly, the number of newborn babies
every year depends on the number of women of childbearing age (aged 15–49) and
corresponding fertility level at each age stage.
Under the condition of maintaining the fertility policy unchanged, the fertility rate at
the age of childbearing for each age stage is given by 2013’s Statistical Yearbook, where
the TFR is about 1.3; compared to the fertility policy unchanged, universal two-child
policy will improve the TFR at each age period by 50 %. Based on the above analysis,
we can infer the sub-fertility level for different ages at the childbearing age under the
universal two-child policy; at the same time, we assume that subsequent annual fertility
level is unchanged after implementing universal two-child policy. Based on the above
hypothesis, taking universal two-child policy into account, sex ratio of newborn ba-
bies will be eased, so we assume that future sex ratio for newborn babies is 110:100.
Finally, the number of newborn babies for i-th period and different gender and the
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lated as follows.
Pmaleiþ1 jþ 1ð Þ ¼ 1−dmalei jð Þ
 
Pmalei jð Þ
Pfemaleiþ1 jþ 1ð Þ ¼ 1−dfemalei jð Þ
 
Pfemalei jð Þ






i jð ÞPfemalei jð Þ










The male and female mortality for j years old in the i-th period is the variable di
male(j)and di
female(j) respectively, the male and female number of aged j years old for i-th
period is the variable Pi
male(j) and Pi
female(j) respectively, and the sub-fertility rate of fe-
male for j years old in the i-th period is the variable TFRi
female(j). It is important to note
that this article assumes that people’s lives are limited, the maximum life span is
100 years old, and individuals for more than 100 years old will automatically exit the
model. According to the above update law, we calculate the total population by adding
the number of population for a different age group and gender in the next 15 years.
Considering China law, population are not allowed to take part in labor until 16 years
old and the population of less than 16 years old is called adolescent. According to the
characteristics of China’s current retirement age, at the same time, we no longer distin-
guish between urban and rural or for different sectors. We assume that the average retire-
ment age is approximately 55 years old, and the retirement system does not affect the
number of working people, but affect the number of the people receiving the pension. So
the population of 16–54 years old is called the working-age population, and the popula-
tion who is over the age of 55 who receive the pension is called the elderly or pensioners.
It should be noted that the working-age population is not equal to the actual number
of the labor population; this is because there are some variables, such as labor force
participation and unemployment, but there are some scenes, for example, on working-
age population participating in the labor. Taking Chinese law, retirement age, and
research question into account, we ignore the scenario of non-labor population partici-
pating in the labor. The labor participation rate for j years old and i-th period is ERi(j);
here we put labor participation rate of sixth census at each age stage as initial labor
participation rate. At the same time, labor participation rate is assumed to be un-
changed for subsequent period. If the number of population for j years old and i-th















j¼16Pi jð ÞER2010 jð Þ;Pi jð Þ ¼ P
female










According to the hypothesis that fertility level is exogenous, as a result, populationstructure is known every year. At the same time, we put motion equation of capital and
human capital into the next stage of production function. Meanwhile, in order to make
initial human capital level become one unit, we introduce a multiplier 1/h2014, so com-
putational level of human capital for i-th period is hi/h2014 in actual simulation. Finally,
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choose consumption and savings per year in order to achieve the goal of maximizing
utility of labor income in the mechanism of raising children to provide against old age,
objective function, and constraints are set as follows every year.
s:t:
MaxUi ¼ C1i
 σ þ β C2i σ
1−τð ÞLiwi ¼ C1i þ Si þ Hiμwi þ Oiϕwi








REi ¼ Pi jð Þ
wi ¼ A 1−αð Þ hi=h2014ð Þ1−α Kið Þα Lið Þ−α
wiþ1 ¼ A 1−αð Þ hiþ1=h2014ð Þ1−α 1−δð ÞKi þ Si þ τ2Liwið Þα Liþ1ð Þ−α
riþ1 ¼ Aα hiþ1=h2014ð Þ1−α 1−δð ÞKi þ Si þ τ2Liwið Þα−1 Liþ1ð Þ1−α
Kiþ1 ¼ 1−δð ÞKi þ Si þ τ2Liwi
hi ¼ eφ sið Þ
Li ¼
X54
j¼16Pi jð ÞER2010 jð Þ
j ¼ 54; 55;…; 64
i ¼ 2014; 2015;…; 2030




To be sure, under the universal two-child policy, firstly, retirement system affects the
number of people who receive a pension each year; for example, according to current
average age of receiving pension, if retirement system remains unchanged, the number
of people who will retire for i-th period is Pi(54), so different retirement systems mean
different value of REi. Of course, the above implies an important hypothesis that the
number of new pensioners each year is equal to the number of people who will be
retiring. Secondly, different parameter combinations imply different pension systems;
for example, pension system is the accumulated pension system or personal account
pension (fully funded pension system, referred to as APS) when τ2 is equal to τand τ1
is equal to 0, pension system is social planning pension or pay as you go system (re-
ferred to as PAYGS) when τ1 is equal to τand τ2 is equal to 0, and pension system is
TAPS when τ2 > 0 and τ1 > 0. Technological progress is seen as institutional dividend
in this paper; of course, the reform of pension system and retirement system can
release productivity level.
Parameter settings
We calculate human capital level of each age segment by using split generation
method, and the results were based on the work of Huang (2011), which accounted for
average years of schooling of post-1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. At the same time, according
to follow-up survey on schooling years of post-1980s in 2014 by Shanghai Jiao tong
University, we successively set that average years of schooling is 12.5 years for post-
1980s, 14.5 years for post-1990s, and 16 years for post-2000s in China. Of course, if we
reduce this standard of schooling settings, conclusions based on simulation will be
more robust. In addition to consumption and savings, other exogenous variables and
parameters are either given or determined by initial conditions or obtained by initial
calibration. Finally, according to existing literatures and China’s census data, parameter
settings are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 Various parameters and value setting
Parameters Value setting Setting basis
Ki (million) 1,329,516 Gu and Zhang (2012)
Li (person) 656,863,206 Sixth census data
α 0.5 Lu and Cai (2014)
A 0.021455305 Calibrated
σ 0.95 Yang (2006)
β 0.98 Liao (2013)
δ 0.05 Lu and Cai (2014)
μ 0.2 Liao (2013)
ɸ 0.1 Yang et al. (2015)
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In view of difference on gender and department of China’s retirement age, meanwhile,
the research emphasis of this paper is the comparison of different pension and retire-
ment systems and the hypothesis that retirement age is equal to the age of receiving
pension, the average age of receiving pension under the undelayed retirement is uni-
formly assumed to be 55 years old without influencing analysis results. At the same
time, we no longer distinguish the difference on gender and department. According to
the above analysis, we choose three types of retirement system: first, undelayed retire-
ment system (referred to as UDR), with average retirement age at 55 years old; second,
immediately delayed retirement system (referred to as IDR), with initial retirement age
at 55 years old, uniformly put off the retirement age of people who is still on duty until
65 years old, and then fix it; and third, gradually delayed retirement system (referred to
as GDR), there is a queue to retire every other year, and retirement age after 2035 is
fixed at 65 years old.
Retirement system does not affect the number of adolescent, but influences the num-
ber of adult and the aged. According to the above model setting, we choose three kinds
of pension scenarios: first, according to the characteristics of current pension system
and the share of capital contribution in China, accumulated pension system led by the
government (referred to as APS), τ2 is equal toτ = 0.14, and τ1 = 0; second, pay-as-you-go
system led by the government (referred to as PAYGS), τ1 is equal to τ = 0.14 and τ2 = 0;
and third, the current tongzhang pension system (referred to as TZPS), according to the
characteristics of current pension system and the share of capital contribution in China,
we give a parameter combination of τ1 = 0.1 and τ2 = 0.04. Of course, our study is based
on the context of universal two-child policy. At the same time, we assume that actual fer-
tility level is equal to policy fertility level. Based on the above hypothesis, we will examine
the influence of various retirement and pension scenarios on social output and family util-
ity and then select suitable retirement and pension scenarios according to some policy
goals. Of course, comparative results of different retirement or pension system scenarios
are robust for other parameter scenarios. Due to space limitation, author will not list other
simulation scenarios; the specific solution process is shown in Additional file 1. Because
different retirement system and pension system only affect population structure and par-
ameter value of τ1 and τ2, here, we only give a scenario code under the condition of UDR
and TZPS; you can acquire the other simulation results for the other scenarios by giving
other population structure and parameter value of τ1 and τ2.
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migration policy remaining unchanged, the share of capital contribution remaining un-
changed, without regard to the differences in sex and between rural population and
urban population, investment equaling to savings; no idle pension and no corruption in
the pension; the pension of accumulative system all taking part in investment, same
returns of savings and pensions; regarding technological progress as reform dividend,
exogenous fertility level, factor (labor and capital) reward paid according to marginal
output and no industrial updating; the age of receiving pension equaling to retirement
age, retirement system which only affects the number of pensioners; and so on.
Population structure in the future
With the change of population generation, post-1960s baby boomers gradually enter into
labor market. From Fig. 2, we can see that, firstly, after 2015, China’s elderly dependency
ratio show a linear upward trend and increase by about 2 percentage points per year. Sec-
ondly, there is a slight increase in dependency ratio in the future which increase by about
0.6 percentage points per year. Thirdly, China’s total social dependency ratio shows a
sharp upward trend which is mainly dependent on the rising trend of elderly dependency
ratio. In short, accompanied by China’s post-1960s baby boomers enter into retirement
age. China’s aging does show accelerated trend. At the same time, prior to 2030, the uni-
versal two-child policy adopted by current government cannot reduce elderly dependency
ratio and total social dependency ratio, so we need to reform pension system and retire-
ment system to buffer the impact of retirement tide on social and economic system in the
critical period of achieving two goals of 100 years and the access to developed countries.
Policy selection based on the goal of social output
As is seen from Figs. 3 and 4, with fertility policy remaining unchanged, no matter what
kind of pension and retirement scenarios, gross output and per capita output all shows
a rapidly increased trend. Under the same retirement system, gross output and perYear












total social dependency ratio
Fig. 2 The trend of different dependency ratio in the future
Year




































Fig. 3 Gross output for different pension and retirement scenarios
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highest, and TZPS which is implementing by current government, is the middle. No
matter what kind of pension system, gross output and per capital output of delayed
retirement is higher than that of undelayed retirement, and IDR’s gross output and per
capita output is higher than that of GDR. Under the same pension system, if based on
the perspective of maximizing gross output and per capita output, the government
should give the preference to the IDR, and also due to the lowest gross output of
PAYGS under the same retirement system, the higher effect of APS on output and per
capita output, a combination scenario of APS and IDR should be chosen.
Why is the per capita output and gross output of PAYGS is the lowest? Firstly, rela-
tive to APS and TZPS, after 2015,with post-1990s and 2000s baby busters successivelyYear






























Fig. 4 Per capita output for different pension and retirement scenarios
Yang China Finance and Economic Review  (2016) 4:11 Page 12 of 15entering into labor market and post-1960s baby boomers just now starting to reach the
age of receiving pension, the PAYGS of current young people supporting current old
people will make pension outlay of Chinese economy already lack of labor force more
bigger, reduce household savings and social investment, which will lead to the decrease
of capital stock; secondly, relative to APS and TZPS, the pension of PAYGS does not
take part in future production and increase capital stock. Therefore, its output and per
capita output is more lower than that of TZPS and APS. Why gross output and per
capita output of TZPS is lower than that of APS? TZPS is a pension system dominated
by PAYGS, compared to APS. Its cumulative effect and capital increase effect is weaker
than that of TZPS. In the case of same number of labor population, TZPS has lower
capital stock, so gross output and per capita output of TZPS is lower than that of APS.
Why is output and per capita output of IDR higher than that of GDR? After 2015, in
the case of largest post-1960s baby boomers gradually exiting labor market in China,
the number of the aged will increase rapidly and the number of working-age population
will decrease sharply in the future. According to the attributes of IDR, no working-age
population will retire until 2025. Based on the features of GDR, only a wave people will
retire each other year after 2015. Working population retires every year for UDR scenario.
Under the condition of the same labor inflow, the labor outflow of UDR is stronger than
that of GDR, and the outflow of GDR is stronger than that of IDR. So delayed retirement
system increases the future number of labor population, reduces pension spending, in-
creases capital stock, and thereby increases output and per capita output. Of course, the
output effect of IDR is stronger than that of GDR.
Policy selection based on the goal of family utility
Utility value of objective function maximization of labor population is regarded as over-
all social welfare or total utility. The total utility divided number of labor population is
regarded as per capita social welfare level or per capita utility level. As shown in Fig. 5,
on per capita utility level, no matter under what kind of pension systems, UDR is allYear


























Fig. 5 Per capita utility for different pension and retirement scenarios
Yang China Finance and Economic Review  (2016) 4:11 Page 13 of 15the highest, followed by GDR and IDR; no matter under what kinds of retirement
systems, PAYGS is all the lowest. APS is higher than TZPS. If a country wants to
maximize per capita utility, no matter under what kinds of pension systems, it should
give priority to UDR system, while discarding IDR. From the perspective of per capita
utility maximizing, UDR and APS should be implemented; if taken into account the
reform difficulty and based on the goal of maximizing per capita utility, then a com-
bination of GDR and APS system should be selected.
Why per capita utility under delayed retirement is lower than that of undelayed re-
tirement scenario? With average life expectancy unchanged, delayed retirement means
the extension of working time, consumption postponement and compulsory savings,
and the increase of capital stock, so, it increases output. But under the assumption of
an economic man, due to the utility of future consumption per unit is lower than that
of present consumption per unit, so per capita utility will decrease according to objec-
tive function. That is, every worker under the condition of delayed retirement will have
to work longer than before, become more patient with economic prospect and reduce
more present consumption to increase savings, and provide more heritages to their
children. Delayed retirement also means that the labor population have to work longer,
receive much less pension, and carry on less present consumption and private con-
sumption because discount factor is less than 1 and people give larger weight to present
consumption and private consumption. Therefore, delayed retirement will decrease per
capita utility for every adult.
Policy selection based on the goal of economic growth
As shown in Fig. 6, with fertility policy and factor efficiency remaining unchanged, the
sharp decline trend of economic growth cannot be changed by the reform of pension
and retirement system; but the comparison results of pension and retirement systems
on economic growth is roughly analogous to that of pension and retirement system on
gross output and per capita output. The difference is that economic growth will enterYear


























Fig. 6 Economic growth for different pension and retirement scenarios
Yang China Finance and Economic Review  (2016) 4:11 Page 14 of 15into new situation of low speed in the future, while gross output and per capita output
still show an increasing trend. In fact, China’s economy has hit demographic cliff; the
reform influence of pension or retirement system on the trend characteristic of eco-
nomic growth in the next 15 years will be insignificant. When the policies of blocking
labor outflow do not work, there is something wrong with the labor inflow.
Post-1990s and 20000s are the baby busters in China, with post-1990s and 2000s
baby busters gradually entering into the labor market after 2015, even if there is no
labor outflow, due to the birth decrease year by year after 1987; 20 years later, the num-
ber of entrant entering into the labor market present a decreasing trend. The economic
growth will only depend on the growth of labor population when capital growth and
technology level remain unchanged. So, accompanied by a decline in the growth of
labor population, economic growth will also show a corresponding decline trend. Of
course, the delay in retirement and the reform in pension system only reduce the
extent of decline, but do not change the decline trend. More seriously, after 2015, if we
take successive retirement of post-1960s baby boomers into account, the extent of
decline will be greater, ensuing demographic debt as well as gradual disappearance of
capital dividend. Under the condition of unchanged production mode, China’s economy
will fall into demographic cliff.
Conclusions
Around 2015, due to the decrease of working-age population and dramatic increase of
the aged caused by the alternation of population generation, in order to win time for
the upgrading of industrial structure, the improvement of population quality and
technological progress, and also to mitigate the impact of fast aging on economic sys-
tem, it is necessary to look for suitable retirement and pension systems. Of course,
there are a lot of contents on pension and retirement reform. In this paper, the author
pays more attention to choose pension mode based on intergenerational distribution
and choose retirement mode ignoring industry and regional and gender differences.
Simulation results show that no matter under what kind of retirement system, output
and per capita utility of PAYGS is the lowest and output and per capita utility of APS is
higher than that of TZPS. No matter under what kind of pension system, the output of
IDR is the highest, followed by GDR and UDR; while on per capita utility level, no matter
under what kind of pension system, UDR is the highest, followed by GDR and IDR. For a
country, if based on the goal of maximizing output, a combination of IDR and APS should
be implemented. If based on the goal of maximizing per capita utility, a combination of
UDR and APS should be implemented. Taking reform resistance, output goal, and welfare
goal into account, a compromise scheme which is a combination of GDR and APS should
be implemented. Of course, the current TZPS is only a transitional pension system; APS
is that we should choose in the aging society. It is gratifying that China is formulating a
gradual retirement scheme and will try to carry out fully funded pension system.
Of course, there are a lot of reforms on the pension and retirement system in China.
The above study is merely to provide the reader a reform direction on pension and
retirement system. Pension and retirement system reform in China is a systematic
and complex issue. Only if we take the combination of the pension reform can we
achieve the desired policy goals. We not only deal with the relationship between the
intergeneration but also have to deal with the relationship between the central and
Yang China Finance and Economic Review  (2016) 4:11 Page 15 of 15local governments; we not only delay retirement age based on life expectancy but also
develop different retirement system for different industries and gender, which are the
directions for future research.
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